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Introduction 
The Shadows of the Wall: Reappraising the Israeli Occupation Regime 
Stéphanie Latte Abdallah and Cédric Parizot 
 
Author’s manuscript to be published in Israelis and Palestinians in the Shadows of the Wall: Spaces of 
Separation and Occupation, Ashgate, 2015 
 
Erected by Israel in 2002, the West Bank Wall is the most imposing, visible, and costly control edifice 
built since the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in June 1967. Built to embody the 
Israeli policy of unilateral separation (hafrada), it has become both the venue and target for local and 
international disputes. Now that it has received intensive media exposure, it has become the emblem 
of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: concrete walls or sections of barriers put up by Israel in the West 
Bank now appear on the covers of publications targeting both the general public and the scientific 
community. Changes in the situation and the issues in the conflict are often summarized only through 
discussions revolving around the Wall. 
But this edifice can also be seen as a trap. Mesmerized by the Wall, many local and 
international observers have lost touch with the processes and changes in Israeli occupation policies in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Considering the separation as complete, some observers even 
consider that the terms of the debate and conflict have changed; the Wall therefore hides as much as it 
reveals. 
By bringing together anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, and 
economists, this book attempts to shift the focus from the Wall itself to the shadows it casts. It 
attempts to analyze the reconfigurations of Israeli occupation policies and therefore understand the 
nature of the separation implemented in the West Bank and Gaza over the past 20 years. Our 
perspective highlights the role of the local and international actors and institutions that have 
contributed to redeploying these systems of control, whether by participating in their administration or 
by circumventing or appropriating them for their own ends. 
 
 
We will see how, whilst playing on the image of the border, the implementation of the Israeli 
separation policy causes a profound reorganization of the economic, social, and political relations of 
domination between Israeli and Palestinian populations. By perpetuating and increasing their relations 
of interdependence, the occupation regime is compromising the creation of a viable Palestinian State 
in a near future. 
 
[Insert map I.1 on the next page so that it will face the text] 
Map I.1 Separation Wall, July 2010 
 
A World-Famous yet Unfinished Structure  
Promoted by its partisans and detractors alike, the excessive media coverage of the Wall has 
contributed to making it the chief focus for local and international confrontations. But all this media 
attention makes the world forget that the principal role this barrier was designed to perform has not 
been achieved. In the context of local and international pressures that are difficult to reconcile, the 
planners have had to revise the route of the wall several times. Completion of the project has been 
postponed so many times that in 2014 it remained largely unfinished, and at that time, at least, created 
no territorial separation between Israelis and Palestinians. 
 
The Materialization of a Security Policy 
In Israel the building of the Wall was launched in response to increasing popular pressure as a result of 
an escalation of Palestinian suicide bombings that peaked in spring 2002 (Kershner 2005). The Israeli 
population demanded concrete, tangible measures from the Sharon government (Arieli and Sfard 
2008). Apart from creating a climate of terror, these bombings challenged the ability of the state to 
defend its citizens (Dieckhoff 2003). The Wall was thus conceived as a way of ending the bombings 
and restoring the sovereignty of the state over its territory. 
The left wing parties which included some of the chief promoters of the project (Rabinowitz 
2003) depicted the construction of the Wall as a way of avoiding the reversal of the demographic 
balance in favor of the Arabs. Certain observers even thought that the Wall would complete the 
 
 
building of the nation by giving Israel borders worthy of a modern state (Halper 2003; Arieli and Sfard 
2008; Rabinowitz 2003). And following 9/11, the building of the Barrier was seen as erecting a border 
that many people considered, to use a neologism, “civilizational,” a rampart between the “free world” 
and “obscurantism” (Rabinowitz 2003). 
Coming from the Israeli population and political class, this pressure continued and persuaded 
Ariel Sharon, who had hitherto been very skeptical about the Wall, to implement its construction. 
Sharon only agreed to the project on the condition that its path would incorporate the most significant 
groups of settlements and a large amount of land into Israeli territory (Arieli and Sfard 2008, p. 49). 
He saw this as a way of shifting the border of Israel past the Green Line1 and making legitimate the 
land acquired for Israeli settlement (Snegaroff and Blum 2005). At the elections in 2006, in his 
“convergence” plan for the withdrawal of Israeli settlements from the east of the Wall, Ehud Olmert, 
head of the center-right Kadima party, presented the Wall as the de facto future border between the 
two states. Eight years later, on January 2014, a prominent Israeli think tank, the Institute for National 
Security Studies, also suggested relying on the Barrier route to fix the limit of Israel’s withdrawal 
from the West Bank if talks sponsored by the Americans failed. The Eastern limit of that 
“disengagement” would be the Jordan Valley (Cohen 2014). 
In Israel, the Wall project had thus gradually brought together the political agendas of the left 
and the right. By combining elements of security, demographics, annexation and, to a certain extent, 
border strategy (Parizot 2009a), it had attracted consensus from all but extreme left activists fighting 
the occupation (Lamarche 2009, 2013). 
 
Symbol of a Policy of Predation and Confinement 
For the Palestinians the Wall is just one more way of stealing from them; its construction has resulted 
in numerous spoliations and destructions that have had disastrous economic consequences. These are 
                                               
1 The Green Line is the 1949 armistice line between Israel and Jordan. It runs through the heart of Jerusalem and divides the 
East (Palestinian sector) from the West, and the West Bank from Israel inside its 1948 borders. 
 
 
regularly recorded by Palestinian NGOs as well as Israeli2 and international NGOs and agencies.3 
Subject to repeated border closures and long periods of curfew since the beginning of the second 
Intifada (Bocco et al. 2002), the Palestinians have experienced the building of the Wall as a new way 
of imprisoning them. In fact, the Wall embodies the limits on movement progressively imposed on 
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since the 1990s (Abu Zahra 2007). The Wall 
imprisons the Palestinians in a ghetto whose size has been gradually reduced to almost nothing. Lastly, 
it also fragments the Palestinian zones on the West Bank and isolates communities that have remained 
to the west of its path from those to the east. In 2013, for example, 11,000 Palestinians living in 32 
communities found themselves trapped between the path of the Green Line and that of the Wall 
(UNOCHA 2013); if we add the 248,4004 Palestinians in East Jerusalem, we get a total of 259,400 
people. 
 
[Insert map I.2 on the previous/next page so that it will face the text] 
Map I.2 A, B and C areas in the West Bank 
 
The Wall has not only taken farmers away from their land, it has also profoundly disrupted the 
economic and social relations between neighboring populations, between centers and their peripheries, 
just as it has reduced levels of access to health and education for certain communities. By doing so, the 
Wall has created more obstacles to the construction of a viable Palestinian economy and state. 
 
                                               
2 On the Palestinian side, see, for example, PENGON (2003); on the Israeli side, see the reports on the B’Tselem site 
(http://www.btselem.org/english/accessed January 7, 2015) and Ir Amim (http://www.ir-amim.org.il/eng/accessed April 8, 
2014). 
3 Regarding international agencies and teams, see, for example, the work of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, occupied Palestinian territory (http://www.ochaopt.org/), and also the series of reports drawn up by HPEG (2003) 
and Bocco et al. (2003). 
4 See “Special Statistical Bulletin on the 65th Anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba,” May 14, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?tabID=512&lang=en&ItemID=788&mid=3171&wversion=Staging, accessed 
February 4, 2014. 
 
 
A Theatre of Local and International Conflicts 
In order to seek international aid, Palestinian NGOs have launched a number of media campaigns. An 
example is the Stop Wall Campaign supported by PENGON, a federation of several local NGOs. 
Palestinians have been backed up by Israeli NGOs such as B’Tselem and HaMoked,5 as well as 
international NGOs. The information published on the internet by these organizations offers a counter 
narrative to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.6 
Local populations directly affected by progress in the building work also mobilized to launch 
non-violent types of opposition; on numerous occasions these campaigns have seen such groups taking 
their cases to the Israeli Supreme Court. These cases have enabled some plaintiffs to have building 
work suspended for a time or, in a few cases, to redraw the path of the Wall (Kershner 2005). 
Palestinian populations have also demonstrated every week, for instance at Bili’in and Na’alin, or 
Nabi Saleh focusing mainly on settlers’ land grabs in their villages and surrounding areas. These 
villages have attracted considerable media attention as the focus of clashes between the Israeli army 
on one side and Palestinian, Israeli (such as Anarchists against the Wall), and international 
demonstrators7 on the other (Lamarche 2011, 2013). 
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has ended up using diplomatic channels. The international 
community has been moved to act several times. While the project to build a “security barrier” to 
prevent Palestinian suicide bombers has not been challenged as such, the main international actors 
involved in the conflict (the United States, Europe, the United Nations, etc.) do not support Israel’s 
attempts to annex additional territory. In 2003 the United States intervened to halt the construction of 
certain portions which, in their opinion, directly threatened the process of building a Palestinian State;8 
                                               
5 Website: http://www.hamoked.org, accessed January 7, 2015. 
6 Website of the Israeli Ministry of Defense: http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/pages/eng/purpose.htm, accessed January 28, 
2014. 
7 Because these populations have again enjoyed the support of Israeli NGOs such as Ta’ayush, Anarchists Against the Wall, 
Gush Shalom, etc., and international associations such as the Internal Solidarity Movement or Les Missions civiles. 
8 This was why Ariel Sharon had to cancel the construction of the first portions of the Barrier between the Jordan valley and 
the region of Jenin. The original plan was to build the Wall not just to the west, but also to the east of the main Palestinian-
 
 
in July 2004 in an advisory opinion sought by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice at 
The Hague declared the route of the Wall in the West Bank illegal.9 
In addition to pressure from the Palestinians and international community, action has also 
come from Israeli settlers: rather than halting the project, they have made efforts to ensure that their 
settlements would be on the right side of the Barrier. Their lobbying and appeals to the Israeli 
Supreme Court have been successful on several occasions (Blum and Snegaroff 2005; Backman 2006, 
p. 238–59). 
 
An Unfinished Project 
The irreconcilable nature of local and international pressure has led the planners to revise the route of 
the Wall several times. They have gradually had to move it nearer and nearer to the Green Line and its 
path has become very winding and discontinuous. 
These inconsistencies have created a rather absurd situation: from a strictly territorial 
viewpoint the barrier does not create any separation between Israeli and Palestinian territory, nor does 
it distinguish inside from outside. It also often separates some parts of Israel from others. Crossing the 
Wall does not necessarily mean a change of jurisdiction (Parizot 2009c): for example, Israeli drivers 
travelling from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea have to cross the Wall, but remain on a road that runs 
through an area controlled exclusively by Israel. Furthermore, the pursuit of settlement building 
behind the Wall has maintained Israeli enclaves on the Palestinian side. In order to protect these 
settlements as well as certain roads leading to them, “in-depth barriers” have been built, thereby 
maintaining “extraterritorial Israeli zones” and breaking up the Palestinian territories even further. The 
                                                                                                                                                   
occupied zones of the West Bank. The eastern wall would have made it possible to keep the Jordan valley and its settlements 
inside Israel (Ariel and Sfard 2008, p. 43). 
9 The Court ruled by fourteen votes to one that the construction of a barrier in the Palestinian-occupied West Bank and 
around east Jerusalem was in breach of international law. It asked Israel to halt building work, demolish those sections 
located in the West Bank and make reparation for the damage caused. By thirteen votes to one, the court asked states not to 
recognize the de facto situation or assist Israel in maintaining or pursuing the construction (Finkelstein 2005, p. 204–5). 
 
 
more the route of the Wall has approached the Green Line,10 the more “in-depth barriers” have been 
built and the more the Wall has created enclaves (Weizman 2007, p. 176). 
 
[Insert map I.3 on previous/next page so that it will face the text] 
Map I.3 Palestinian and Israeli areas in the West Bank, 2009 
 
The Wall also divides Palestinian areas from the rest of the Palestinian territories. It firstly created a 
number of Palestinian enclaves on the Israeli side; then it defined Palestinian enclaves on the 
Palestinian side. Its tortuous path, attempting to include the maximum number of settlements on the 
Israeli side, created pockets encircling Palestinian communities on several sides. In 2009, to the east of 
the Wall, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA 2009) 
estimated that 125,000 Palestinians were surrounded by the barrier on three sides and that 26,000 were 
completely surrounded and only able to leave the enclaves by specially built bridges or tunnels. 
Lastly, the inability of the Israelis to reconcile the local and international pressures has 
considerably slowed the construction of the barrier. While half the planned structure was completed 
between the summer of 2002 and the summer of 2006, between 2006 and 2012 only a further 12 
percent was built. The initial schedule, which set the end of building work for 2008, has now 
considerably overrun. In July 2012 only two-thirds of the barrier had been finished (UNOCHA 2013) 
and many sections were not operational. Located in the heart of the West Bank, the sections that still 
have to be built have provoked—and will certainly provoke in the future—greater opposition from the 
various parties. Since 2008 the Wall appears to have lost its status as a priority for the population and 
the government of Israel. In this context in which the suicide bombings have stopped and/or the 
separation is considered to have been effected and acknowledged, the Israelis no longer appear to care 
about it (Parizot 2009a). 
                                               
10 Shaul Ariel and Michael Sfard (2008, p. 42) stressed that initial forecasts caused Ariel Sharon to envisage the possibility of 
unilaterally annexing 45 percent of the West Bank. Successive re-estimates made under local and international pressure have 
reduced this area to less than 10 percent, i.e. to an area almost equivalent to what the negotiators envisaged at Taba (2001) 
and during the Geneva initiative (2003). 
 
 
 
Separation: The Reorganization of the Israeli Occupation 
If we are to understand the nature of the separation Israel has imposed on Palestinians, its territorial 
and institutional implications and its influence on the directions the conflict has taken and the stakes 
involved, we have to look back to the moment the separation was introduced in the early 1990s and 
then trace its subsequent readjustments. The separation policy was implemented differently at the time 
of the Oslo Accords (1993–2000) from the subsequent period (2000–2014). This policy has gradually 
reorganized the Israeli modes of civilian and military occupation to the extent that, by the beginning of 
the second decade of the twenty-first century this regime of occupation had come to seem permanent, 
taking complex territorial, administrative and institutional form. Moreover, the cost of the occupation 
appears to be increasingly covered by Palestinian and international actors. 
 
1993–2000: The Oslo Negotiations 
The separation policy was launched at the time of the First Intifada (1987–1993). Since December 
1987 the confrontations between the occupying forces and the Palestinian population have revived the 
idea of borders in that they have given the landscape a line separating the areas the Palestinians lived 
in from those where the Israelis lived (Grinberg 2010). The confrontations highlighted the failure of 
the system of occupation deployed since June 1967 by Israel. The separation policy had been 
promoted by Itzhak Rabin, the minister of defence, then prime minister of the State of Israel from 
1992 to 1995 (Arieli and Sfard 2008). The policy was based on the introduction of restrictions on 
movement including travel permits (Handel 2009a; Hanieh 2006; Hass 2002) that gradually put in 
place a system for filtering the Palestinians willing to enter into Israel (Parizot 2010). The boundaries 
imposed were no longer those of 1967; instead they confirmed the annexing of East Jerusalem and the 
surrounding areas. These regions had been forbidden to Palestinians from other regions of the West 
Bank at the beginning of 1993 (Abu Zahra 2007). 
The Oslo negotiations followed by the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Washington 
in September 1993 reinforced this process of separation while giving it an administrative, negotiated 
dimension. Israel was able to delegate the administration of the occupied population to the PA created 
 
 
in 1994. Between 1993 and 2000, as successive agreements were signed, the Israeli army withdrew 
from the zones in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that had passed into Palestinian autonomy. In the 
euphoria of the first years, some saw these withdrawals as the prelude to a full disengagement of Israel 
from the West Bank and Gaza. 
Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s, due to the failure of the Oslo process, the occupation 
remained in place. Yet, its character had changed since the Palestinians and their international 
financial backers found themselves de facto involved in managing or supporting its costs. The PA 
quickly acquired the appearance and symbols of the quasi-state it had been supposed to become at the 
end of the interim period (1998). This process had been encouraged by the intervention of 
international organizations and institutions (European Union, United Nations, World Bank, 
cooperation with various countries and many NGOs, etc.) who got involved very early on to support 
the negotiation process and the construction of the economy and State of Palestine.11 But this direct 
international aid to the budget of the PA was due to end in 1996, by which time it was thought that the 
Palestinian economy would have been relaunched and political and territorial sovereignty would be on 
the way to realization (Brynen 2000). But the rapid deterioration of the political situation has 
prevented the development of an independent Palestinian economy that was sufficiently robust to meet 
these costs. Sustained international aid has in fact become a way of ensuring the functioning of a PA 
and economy that could not survive independently—an authority which nevertheless took over in 
1994 some portfolios and costs previously paid for by the Israeli authorities: health, education, police, 
taxation, etc. Therefore, international actors and the PA found themselves constrained to sub-contract 
part of the Israeli occupation (Bocco and Mansouri 2008; Latte Abdallah, 2011; Ophir, Givoni, and 
Hanafi 2009). 
In territorial terms, the Oslo Accords led to the division of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
into three types of zone, known as A, B, and C. In the A zones, Israel delegated security and civil 
                                               
11 At this time, 43 countries committed the sum of four billion dollars to support the building of institutions by the Palestinian 
Authority, to develop the economy, infrastructure, and civil society up to the end of the interim period. Part of this sum was 
intended directly to fund the Palestinian Authority and contributed largely to setting up its administration, its ministers and 
services (education, health, etc.), its security forces and police (Brynen 2000; Lia 2007). 
 
 
control to the PA; in the B zones, the PA was responsible for public order and the internal security of 
the Palestinians while Israel reserved the right to act on any questions of external security. Lastly, the 
C zones remained under Israeli control. 
The gradual deterioration of relations between the parties and the successive failures of 
negotiations have caused the withdrawal of the Israelis to be postponed on several occasions. The 
Israelis have also increased the number of fait accompli on the ground so that they will be in a position 
of strength when negotiations on the final status take place. Whilst agreeing to abandon some of the 
territories occupied in 1967, they have reorganized their civil and military occupation to increase their 
presence in the C zones. 
On the eve of the Second Intifada (2000), these redeployments had left a patchwork of 
Palestinian enclaves that were isolated from one another. In the West Bank, the A zones at the time 
only accounted for 17 percent of the West Bank, the B zones 23 percent, and the C zones 60 percent. 
In the Gaza Strip, the independent Palestinian zones covered 65 percent of the territory, the Israelis 
maintaining control of the remainder of zones in which there were settlements. 
The isolation of the enclaves was reinforced particularly as a response to Palestinian suicide 
bombings in Israeli towns, and in order to pursue the separation policy the army increased the number 
of closures and drastically increased controls on Palestinian workers employed in Israel (Farsakh 
2002, 2005; Kelly 2006; Parizot 2008). This period was therefore seen by the Palestinians as the 
affirmation of a policy of confinement and hardening of the occupation mechanisms. It was also in this 
context and that of the failure of the Oslo negotiations that the Second Intifada broke out in September 
2000. 
 
2000–2014: Separation and Interconnectedness 
The readjustments made by the Israeli occupation regime at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
were radically different in character from those made during the previous period. And for good reason: 
the Israelis no longer saw the future in the same way as they did during the Oslo Accords period. Since 
the start of the Second Intifada most members of the Israeli ruling class along with its ordinary citizens 
were convinced that a negotiated solution to the conflict was now impossible (Cypel 2005). The Israeli 
 
 
redeployments during this period therefore tried both to regain long-term control over security in the 
Palestinian enclaves and move unilateral separation forward. 
During the Second Intifada (2000–2004) the Israeli army entered regularly the autonomous 
Palestinian areas to attack the armed groups; in 2002, in an operation codenamed “Defensive Shield” 
(homat magen), the Israeli army massively invaded these zones. It directly targeted the PA’s forces 
and infrastructure, accusing it of being mainly responsible for the uprising and Palestinian suicide 
bombings in Israeli towns. The Palestinian security forces were besieged in their barracks along with 
the President of the PA, Yasser Arafat who, until his death in 2004, was confined in his compound in 
Ramallah. Furthermore, the Palestinian populations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were 
subjected to unprecedented closures and curfews (Bocco et al. 2002a, 2002b). 
At the same time, in the face of Israeli popular pressure demanding that the state take tangible 
measures to end the suicide bombings and impose a unilateral solution to the conflict, the political 
leaders have opted to pursue and implement the policy of separation from the Palestinians. It was also 
during summer 2002, a few months after organizing the renewed invasion of the Palestinian enclaves, 
that the Sharon government agreed to launch the building of the Wall (Arieli and Sfard 2008). 
The combination of these two approaches led to the implementation of new Israeli control 
mechanisms. But the way these mechanisms operate is very different in the West Bank from the Gaza 
Strip. In the West Bank the army reinforced its long-term presence, maintaining a solid encirclement 
around the Palestinian enclaves by setting up a large number of outposts around the zones and 
increasing the number of checkpoints and obstacles on the roads linking them (trenches, road blocks, 
earth mounds, concrete blocks, watchtowers, etc.).12 In this way it sought to reduce interaction with 
the Palestinians while maintaining tight control over their movements (Ben Ari et al. 2004)13 and 
                                               
12 Since 2002 the number of obstacles controlling the movement of Palestinians has constantly risen. In June 2009, the United 
Nations listed 698, including 76 permanent and 23 partial checkpoints (OCHA 2009). 
13 Between 1994 and 1999 the Israeli army imposed 443 closure days, an average of two and a half months each year. These 
measures had serious repercussions on Palestinian employment and economy and had a decisive effect on the flow of labor 
into Israel. Between 1992 and 1996 the number of Palestinian workers crossing the Line fell by 51 percent. It started to rise in 
1997 and reached 145,000 people in August 2000 (Parizot 2008). 
 
 
reserving itself the right to intervene regularly in the heart of their living space (Amidror 2007). These 
operations included targeted assassinations, arrests, and intelligence operations (Cohen 2009; Latte 
Abdallah, Natsheh, and Parizot, in this volume; Razoux 2006; Weizman 2007). 
Such controls have become more oppressive as the number of settlements kept on increasing. 
In 2011, the number of settlers in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reached 520,000 people 
(UNOCHA 2012). The rhythm of increase was equivalent on both sides of the Wall.14 If communal 
areas and those under the jurisdiction of regional councils are included, the 122 Israeli settlements 
alone control 41.9 percent of the West Bank or nearly 80 percent of the C zones under Israeli 
jurisdiction. This area works out even larger if the bypass roads are included. Although they ease 
travel for the settlers and the army by making it unnecessary for them to pass through Palestinian 
settlements, they have fragmented the Palestinian territories and limited both urban and rural 
development (B’Tselem 2004, p. 6–7; Handel 2009a, p. 204–7). 
The security cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians gradually resumed after the death 
of Arafat in 2004. On the West Bank this only became a reality in 2007 when, under the leadership of 
the Americans, and particularly General Dayton, the Israeli government agreed to the redeployment of 
Palestinian forces in the major towns of the West Bank (Legrain 2010). The authorization of this 
redeployment was also due to the Israeli desire to counter Hamas, which took power in the Gaza Strip 
in 2007. Besides, once redeployed, the forces of Fatah played a determining role in disbanding the 
armed groups, and Hamas in the West Bank. 
The new systems of control introduced in the West Bank were envisaged as long-term, the 
Israeli authorities making every effort to reduce their political and financial cost (Havkin and Latte 
Abdallah, in this volume). The building of “crossing points” (Hebrew: ma’avarim) along the 
Separation Wall, which were presented as “border terminals,” and the use of private companies to 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
14 See Foundation for Middle East Peace (2007), “Settler Population Growth East and West of the Barrier, 2000–2009,” and 
Nadav Shragaï (2007), “Most Settlements Lie East of Fence, Most Settlers West”. Available at: 
http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/population-growth-east-and-west-of-the-barrier, 
accessed December 30, 2010. 
 
 
manage the crossing points were all part of this strategy. The architecture, location, facilities, and 
operation as well as the terminology used to describe these new checkpoints confer a less obviously 
violent appearance to control. The use of private security companies to ensure the operation of the 
crossings and perform security checks depoliticized the control (Havkin 2008, in this volume). Some 
military experts responsible for planning in the Palestinian zones have even used the concept of 
“invisible occupation” (Weizman 2009). 
The adoption of the Gaza disengagement project (hitnatkut) by Ariel Sharon fulfilled the same 
strategy (Signoles 2005). Moreover, Sharon saw in it a way to escape from the framework laid down 
by the Quartet15 and the Road Map: drawn up in 2003, the Road Map set out the plan that the conflict 
should end in the creation of a Palestinian State by 2005 (Grinberg 2010). Ariel Sharon’s advisor Dov 
Weiglass explained that the aim of the operation was to divert the attention of the international 
community and the Palestinian population while the West Bank was being settled (Signoles 2005, p. 
120). 
This withdrawal kept the Palestinians under a different type of occupation. While it certainly 
resulted in the departure of 8,000 settlers and the military bases protecting them, Israel introduced new 
systems of remote control. The army maintained its control over air and sea space and forbade the 
movement of residents in a kilometer wide corridor along the demarcation line. Lastly, the Israeli 
authorities kept their control over the crossing points for people and goods, thereby controlling the 
flow of imports and exports as well as the movement of Palestinians trying to enter or leave the Gaza 
Strip. By tightening its grip on the coastal strip, the army set up a veritable siege around Gaza; using 
very few resources it was able to control or halt supplies of goods, electricity and fuel oil. The 
blockade imposed since 2005 has kept the population on the brink of a humanitarian disaster (Ophir, 
Givoni, and Hanafi 2009, p. 19). This siege, together with Israeli’s increasingly bloody offensives on 
                                               
15 The Quartet is an international diplomatic body founded in 2002 to act as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process. It is made up of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. 
 
 
Gaza in June to July 2006, December 2008 to January 2009,16 November 2012 and July to August 
201415 have nevertheless damaged the image of Israel diplomatically. 
 
Reappraising the Conflict’s Trajectories and the Occupation Regime 
By strengthening the interconnectedness of the Israeli and Palestinian zones, ensuring the long-term 
character of the occupation whilst offloading some of its cost onto the Palestinians and the 
international community, these changes suggest that the trajectories of the conflict and the functioning 
of the separation regime should be seen in a new light. 
 
The Trajectories of the Conflict 
Observers and researchers working on the region often appear to be blind to certain aspects of the 
present situation (Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi 2009, p. 16). The period we are now living through is 
often seen as a period of transition between a time of confrontation and a political solution in the form 
of two states. Every event and process tends to be analyzed in the light of the hypothetical future 
envisaged by some people in the 1990s after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (1993): that 
of the establishment of a Palestinian State at Israel’s side. The failure of the Oslo Accords, the start of 
the Second Intifada and the continuing deterioration of the situation did not really affect this transitory 
view of the conflict. Only a few social scientists have lately started to adopt a more critical analysis 
towards the negotiations (Turner 2014). Some contest the definition of the situation as a conflict 
preferring the concept of settler colonialism to describe the reality on the ground (Collins 2011).  
This transitory reading and the illusion of an end to the crisis which underpins it have been 
encouraged by the lack of precision of the Declaration of Principles signed on 13 September 1993 by 
the Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres and Mahmud Abbas under the supervision of chairman of 
the PLO Yasser Arafat and the Israeli prime minister Itzhak Rabin. The postponement of negotiations 
                                               
16 Immediately after Israel unilaterally declared a ceasefire on January 17, 2009, casualty figures on the Palestinian side were 
more than 1,300 dead and over 5,000 injured as against 13 dead on the Israeli side. 
15 During the 2014 war, more than 2100 Gazans were killed and around 11000 were injured as against 72 dead on the Israeli 
side and approximately 700 wounded.   
 
 
on the final status of the refugees, the borders, Jerusalem, and the settlements allowed everybody to 
imagine their own version of peace without having to take account of other people’s versions 
(Grinberg 2007b). 
The Oslo Accords actually ushered in a new period of misunderstanding and confrontation. 
On the one side, the Palestinians expected a process of decolonization: the withdrawal of troops and 
the repatriation of Israeli settlers to the other side of the Green Line ought to bring independence and 
the creation of their own state with East Jerusalem as its capital, this vision being shared by a large 
number of international actors. It was reinforced by the actions of the United Nations and the 
European Union as well as by financial investment by countries which supported the process. On the 
other side, the Israelis had no intention of discussing the status of all the territories occupied in 1967. 
Jerusalem should remain the unified capital of the State of Israel, the limits of which should include a 
large part of the settlements (Ben Ami 2006, p. 246–7). No government, including those formed by the 
Labour Party, has wanted to dismantle the settlements. The Rabin government even encouraged 
settlers who wanted to return to Israel (the “Returning Home” movement) to stay put in order to 
constitute a bargaining chip in the negotiations with the Palestinians (Grinberg 2010). Rabin and Peres 
hoped that the accords would lead to the creation of a confederation with Jordan rather than the 
founding of a Palestinian State (Smith 2007, p. 454). It was not until May 1997 that the Labour Party 
officially adopted the idea of a Palestinian State with a certain number of conditions (Ben Ami 2006, 
p. 246–7). Although in a speech at Bar Ilan University in 2009 the Israeli prime minister Benyamin 
Netanyahu formally accepted the principle of the creation of a Palestinian State16, he has never 
stipulated clearly the conditions under which he sees this taking place. 
Since the period of the Oslo Accords, the political goal of a Palestinian State has constantly 
been reactivated by political and media discourse. But the positions of the various players on the 
details of how such a state can be brought into existence have constantly changed under the influence 
                                               
16 View the speech on YouTube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NY6fGMC0VtQ, accessed May 2, 2014.  
 
 
of the deteriorating relations between Israelis and Palestinians and failed initiatives to re-launch 
negotiations.17 
The absence of progress in these negotiations set the background to Mahmoud Abbas making 
a unilateral application to the United Nations for Palestine to be recognized as a state On November 
29, 2012, the UN General Assembly upgraded Palestine to a non-member observer state: 138 states 
voted in favor, 41 abstained, and 9 voted against. In the West Bank, the news lead to scenes of 
jubilation; even in the Gaza Strip a mass turnout on the streets greeted the news with expressions of 
joy. 
While the UN General Assembly vote provided a political victory for the Palestinian 
president, this vote did not change the reality on the ground: Palestine is today a UN member state 
deprived of any territorial continuity, and devoid of economic and political control. Finally, on the 
diplomatic level it did not change the balance of power (Parizot 2012). The recent decision made by 
Mahmoud Abbas and his government to adhere to most UN agencies and institutions, including the 
International Court of Justice17, coupled with the expansion of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions 
campaign (BDS) and joint International, Israeli, and Palestinian civil society mobilizations mark a 
clear shift towards a complete internationalization of the conflict that might have some effect on 
Israeli policies in the long run (Latte Abdallah 2014b, 2014c). 
The transitory approach to the conflict encourages mistaken readings of the political reality 
and its challenges. There are three reasons for this; firstly by positioning the two parties on an equal 
footing, this approach gives a distorted perception of the power relations between them. While the 
conflict was seen during the First Intifada (1987–1993) as a confrontation between an army of 
occupation and a population trying to resist with derisory weapons such as boycotts and rocks, from 
                                               
17 The Taba negotiations in 2001; the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 promoted by king Abdullah of Saudi Arabia proposing 
the recognition of the State of Israel by all the Arab countries in exchange for the creation of a Palestinian State inside the 
1967 borders; the Geneva Initiative in 2003; the Road Map in 2003, the Annapolis initiative in 2007; and the recent failed 
attempts by the US state secretary John Kerry to restart the negotiations. While certain plans, such as those of Taba and 
Geneva, have tried to give clear proposals on the final status of refugees, settlements, borders, and Jerusalem, none of them 
have been agreed by both sides. All the other plans have postponed discussions on some of these issues. 
17 Which should be effective in March 2015. 
 
 
the middle of the 1990s it was seen as two opposing parties on an equal footing: a state versus a quasi-
state. Secondly, by focusing on the prospect of the creation of a Palestinian State it stops us thinking 
about the present and therefore about what needs to be done to bring it about. While the recognition of 
a Palestinian State is of political, legal—particularly in terms of the ultimate recourse possible under 
international law—and symbolic importance, the profound changes of position on the ground over the 
last 20 years raise serious doubts about its viability and sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. 
And thirdly, focusing on the notion that we are in a short transitional period that is preparatory to the 
construction of a Palestinian State will not stand the test of time: it is now 21 years since the Oslo 
Accords were signed. This “transitional period” has now lasted longer than that with which it is often 
compared, namely the period between the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by Israel in 
1967 and the start of the First Intifada in 1987. 
It is by taking into account the territorial and institutional changes and the difficulty of 
separating two territorial, political, and economic entities that Palestinian and foreign scholars have 
cast doubt on the possibility of ever witnessing the political prospect of two states (Khalidi 2006; Hilal 
2007; Clot 2010). For example, in the early years of the twenty-first century there was a revival of 
other projects formulated well before the Oslo Accords period: Palestinians suggesting the 
establishment of a single two-nation state (Abunimah 2006) while certain Israelis proposed a 
confederation with Jordan (Morris 2009). Others considered much more complex solutions capable of 
meeting the political, administrative, and territorial obstacles currently present on the ground 
(Grinberg 2010). 
Rather than seeing this period as transitional, the present work suggests we analyze the 
functioning and changes in the occupation regime over the last 21 years. It is by taking account of 
these readjustments that we might come to a better understanding of the types of territoriality and 
government to which they have given rise; it is also on this basis that we may come to a better 
understanding of their consequences for the future of the conflict, the new challenges it hides and the 
ways it might be resolved. 
 
A Contemporary, Post-Modern Occupation Regime 
 
 
A number of works have tried to model how the Israeli occupation regime operated between the 1990s 
and 2000s. They provide rich documentation on the legal measures defining the status and rights of the 
populations and their unequal access to resources and mobility (Zureik 2001; Kelly 2006; Gordon 
2008, 2009a; Azulay and Ophir 2008; Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi 2009; Grinberg 2010). They also 
question how the lack of rights and limited types of sovereignty imposed on the Palestinians affect the 
operation and nature of the Israeli political regime itself (Yiftachel 2009; Azulay and Ophir 2008; 
Gordon 2008; Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi 2009; Grinberg 2010). Other research from a more strictly 
geographical and architectural perspective has explored the complex ways in which the area between 
the Mediterranean and the River Jordan has been restructured (Efrat 2006; Weizman 2007; Petti 2008; 
Handel 2009a). 
These researchers rightly stress that the lack of clearly defined territorial borders has had the 
corollary, not to say objective, of effacing a whole set of other distinctions, particularly between 
occupation and non-occupation, annexation and non-annexation, temporary and permanent, as well as 
the exception and the rule (Ben Naftali, Michaeli, and Gross 2009), which has meant that the zone 
behind the Green Line is indeterminate in terms of both time and legality. This indeterminate character 
deprives the Palestinians of the protection granted by international law to occupied populations and 
substituted a system of government using a series of regulations, decrees and procedures. 
It was in the perspective of modeling and conceptualizing the situation that in the 1990s some 
researchers started comparing the Israeli political regime with the apartheid regime in South Africa, 
seeing the imposition of restrictions on movement imposed on Palestinian labor and the creation of 
autonomous enclaves administered by the Palestinian Authority as reproducing the system of 
bantustans (Farsakh 2002, 2006; Legrain 1996, 1997; Abu Zahra 2007; Hanieh 2006). Comparisons 
with apartheid increased from 2000 onwards, stimulated particularly by the construction of the Wall 
embodying discrimination and separation (Bishara 2002; Peteet 2009; Yiftachel 2009; Olmsted 2009; 
Dayan 2009; Bôle-Richard 2013; Lebrun and Salingue 2013). These researchers’ objective was not 
simply academic but also political since they were denouncing and mobilizing against an unjust 
regime (Toensing 2009). 
 
 
While such comparisons are helping to understand the Israeli occupation regime, they also 
tendto oversimplify the situation: comparing the Israeli regime in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
with frontier situations, or even ghettos or apartheid tended to make the regime look like an 
anachronistic colonial system.But research into the systems of territorial control used by Israel over 
the last 20 years stresses the very contemporary character of the occupation mechanisms. Indeed, the 
separation policy simultaneously mobilizes a territorial imagination appropriate to the modern state 
and to systems of control that are characteristic of the neoliberal globalization period.  
The promotion by the Israeli authorities of metaphors based on territorial separation—of walls 
and borders—is aimed at meeting the expectations of the Israeli public and international stakeholders 
who conceive territorial control in the framework of the modern nation state, i.e. a homogenous and 
clearly delimited territory over which prevails the state exclusive sovereignty. But as we have already 
stressed, in practice, Israeli systems of control challenge any clear delineation of territory. The 
successive reorganizations of the occupation regime have been in total contradiction with border logic 
(Shamir 2009). Implemented unilaterally by Israel, the separation policy implies no principle of 
symmetry between two states. Nor is it envisaged as a way of separating the Israeli population from 
another population that is perceived as statutorily equivalent: its objective is to contain the Palestinian 
“other” who is seen as highly dangerous. 
The Israeli policy of separation operates more as a mechanism for managing risk in a context 
where the two populations live in close proximity with one another and where their living spaces 
increasingly interpenetrate one another (Shamir 2005). It operates as a system for excluding a 
Palestinian population located inside an area that has remained under Israeli control (Ophir, Givoni, 
and Hanafi 2009). In order to manage the close proximity and interpenetration of the living spaces of 
the Israeli and Palestinian populations as well as to ensure the security of the Israelis, the control 
techniques attempt to dissociate the trajectories of the two populations. They keep the Palestinians at 
arm’s length in order to facilitate the smooth flow of the Israelis in a fluid, uninterrupted space. The 
Palestinians are confined in fragmented areas that are riddled with obstacles and in which movement is 
hampered and/or in which routes cannot be planned due to the frequent changes made to the obstacles 
(Weizman 2007). In this configuration the Israeli settlements and Israel itself constitute an 
 
 
“archipelago” of perfectly linked islands while the Palestinian “enclaves” are isolated from one 
another (Petti 2008). 
In this context the relations between the two populations and their experience of time and 
space have become increasingly asymmetric (Collins 2008; Peteet 2008; Handel 2009; Petti 2008). 
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict should not therefore be seen solely as a territorial conflict but also as a 
conflict about the use of space (Handel 2009a). This inequality in the experience of space has major 
political implications since it gives rise to perceptions of the conflict that are increasingly disparate 
between the various actors (Parizot 2009c, 2010). The Israelis have, since the end of the Second 
Intifada (2004), experienced a normalization of their movements and everyday life; some even 
imagine that the conflict has been moved “to the other side of the wall.” Forbidden entry by the Israeli 
Army to Palestinian enclaves (A zones), they are unaware of the degree to which the Palestinians 
spaces are fragmented and the current impossibility of separating two territories without one 
remaining fragmented and without territorial cohesion. In contrast, the Palestinians are constantly 
confined and controlled and experience the continual reinforcement of the occupation and its violence. 
 
The Actors of the Occupation Regime 
Any study of the Israeli occupation regime has to be dynamic. Neve Gordon (2008) suggests that the 
transformations of the occupation regime should be studied as the product of the interactions, the 
excesses and the contradictions created by the various modes of control deployed by Israel. Using an 
approach derived from Foucault, he considers modes of control not only as the infrastructures, 
techniques and policies of coercion deployed by Israel, but takes into account all the institutions, legal 
measures, bureaucratic apparatus, social practices and material infrastructures that act both on the 
individuals and the population in order to produce new behaviors, new habits, interests, tastes, and 
aspirations. Working along similar lines, Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (2009) have 
published a collection of articles in which the authors attempt to analyze the occupation regime as an 
unstable assemblage of state and non-state apparatus and institutions, of ways of thinking and of a 
series of political technologies (Ophir et al. 2009, p. 15–17). 
 
 
But while these researchers stress the role of the many actors and elements involved in the 
functioning of the regime, they have limited their analysis to the operation of the Israeli systems of 
control and the way it transforms the behavior of actors who are subjected to them. They do not 
envisage how such actors, whether they be Palestinian, Israeli, or international, can react to, subvert, 
or take over these systems of constraints and thus contribute to their readjustments. 
French research, with only a few exceptions (Legrain 1997; Débié and Fouet 2001) has not 
focused on the Israeli occupation regime since the period of the Oslo Accords. Scholars studying 
Palestinian society have concentrated more on the social, economic and political changes it has 
undergone, sometimes in relation to their diaspora. In this way they have offered a series of very rich 
studies (Botiveau and Signoles 2004; Al-Husseini and Signoles 2011; Picaudou 2006; Picaudou and 
Rivoal 2006). Some have also insisted on the need to distance themselves from the conflict and its 
overt effect in order to offer a more nuanced, in-depth approach to Palestinian society (Botiveau, 
Conte and Signoles 2005). Others have also upheld this argument in their approach to the changes in 
Israeli society over the past 20 years (Dieckhoff 2009). 
Starting from the point of view of social actors and setting it alongside the institutional 
perspective, this book offers an alternative view of how the occupation regime operates. We will 
examine both the power deployed by these control mechanisms and the (re)actions of certain groups or 
individuals. We approach power beyond its solely conflictual dimension in order to focus also on its 
productive capacity. Hence, we will analyze how not only the contestations but also the adaptations 
and reappropriations made by these mundane actors when faced with the Israeli modes of control 
contribute in turn to changing the way the mechanisms operate. In a word, we will consider these 
actors as historical subjects. 
 
Mobility and Interactions in the Israeli-Palestinian Space 
In order to highlight the role of these actors in the transformations of the occupation regime we have 
decided to focus on changes in mobility and interactions between Israelis, Palestinians, and 
international actors over the past 20 years. These various actors (individuals, groups, and institutions) 
experience this fragmented territory and its regulations daily and also contribute to constructing and 
 
 
changing them. Observing the transformations of their interactions enables us, beyond the hypothetical 
political goal defined during the period of the Oslo Accords, to understand the current territorial and 
social reality of the conflict and its concrete challenges. We focus our analysis not solely on the 
Palestinian or Israeli side, but on the two at once, and particularly on their interfaces. This approach 
therefore decompartmentalizes research on Palestine and Israel. 
 
Changing Israeli-Palestinian Interactions 
Analyzing mobility confronts researchers with the limits encountered by mundane actors and with the 
more or less coherence of their functioning. It highlights the social, economic, and political 
adaptations these people develop in their daily lives to adapt to the new systems constraints imposed 
by the separation and the degradation of the situation. 
By reorganizing their everyday life, they rework their spaces of social, economic, and political 
interactions at their own level. Before the First Intifada (1987), Israelis and Palestinians met almost 
every day as they moved within the same territories. During the 1990s, the deterioration of the 
situation and the enforcement of the first movement restrictions considerably reduced such 
interactions. But while Israelis stopped visiting Palestinian areas, Palestinians remained very present in 
the Israeli landscape. Palestinian-registered taxis and private cars continued to use Israeli highways 
and Palestinian workers could still be seen. The situation changed again at the end of 2000 onwards 
when the Second Intifada broke out. The two populations no longer met apart from in limited and 
specific places: working sites (in Israel and the settlements), checkpoints, West Bank bypass roads, 
demonstrations, and new commercial places built in C Areas. 
Joint Palestinian and Israeli political activism was also affected by the restrictions of 
movement and the radicalization of the two sides (Pouzol, in this volume). In order to pursue their 
cooperation some activists have developed virtual forms of political actions and networking as well as 
renewed uses of law (data sharing, concerted legal action) (Latte Abdallah 2009, 2010a, 2011). Newly 
created groups focusing on land grab issues and organizing joint events associating Israelis, 
Palestinians, and Internationals activists (Anarchists Against the Wall, Ta’ayush, Fighters for Peace), 
 
 
have invented new practices and habitus that sharply contrast with those of their predecessors in the 
1980s and 1990s (Lamarche, in this volume). 
Finally, some actors have grasped the opportunities generated by this system of constraints. 
The restrictions on movement introduced since the 1990s have forced Palestinian workers employed in 
Israel to turn towards networks of smugglers to help them cross into Israel. These networks became 
increasingly organized and were able to develop very lucrative economic activities (Parizot 2014). The 
Israeli police and intelligence services have allowed this to develop in order to infiltrate these groups 
of traffickers and expand their intelligence networks. By being de facto integrated into the system of 
mobility control, these smugglers have directly contributed to its functioning and its readjustments. 
 
The Locations of Power 
The chapters of this volume play on different scales. While some adopt a macrosocial approach to 
examine the influence of economic interests in political decision-making and changes in the peace 
process in Israel (Grinberg), others develop microsocial perspectives by studying civil volunteers in 
the police (Manor) or post-2000 activists’ trajectories (Lamarche). Others take an intermediary stance 
by tracing both changes in the political relations between Palestinians of Israel and Palestinians of the 
West Bank (Marteu) or LGBTQ movements on both sides of the Green Line (Pouzol). While some 
writers concentrate on the actors, others are more interested in describing new types of 
governmentality. Latte Abdallah and Havkin focus on the influence of new institutional and economic 
practices at precise key points in the systems of control, respectively on managing prisons and on the 
outsourcing of checkpoints. 
Alternating between these different scales, contributors reconsider the many locations of 
power inside and beyond the Israeli-Palestinian spaces. They highlight the roles of a large number of 
actors in tandem with the state in the working of and the changes to Israeli systems of control: formal 
institutions such as international agencies like USAID (Garb), private companies (Havkin) or civil 
guards (Manor). The actors may also be informal such as the smugglers trafficking consumer goods 
between Israel and the West Bank (Natsheh and Parizot) or between Egypt and the Gaza Strip 
(Pelham). Studying how people work around Israeli mechanisms of control or use them for their own 
 
 
ends highlights the fact that even marginal groups contribute to the working of and readjustments in 
such systems. Finally, we scrutinize the construction of discourses and representations on the 
separation and the conflict through the practices and experience of NGOs and institutions (Handel), 
mundane actors, Israelis (Manor), Palestinians (Marteu and Nashif), as well as internationals activists 
(Hecker).. 
 
Book Structure 
This book is organized around four parts. Part I considers the transformations of the geography of the 
occupation. Chapter 1 and 2 focus on the practices and devices by which Israel controls mobility and 
confines Palestinians: the checkpoints infrastructure (Havkin) and the prison system (Latte Abdallah). 
They show how these transformations are strongly shaped by neoliberal thought and to what extent 
they normalize or make invisible the occupation. For, they contribute to redraw the limits between 
spaces and time, contradicting the declared objectives of the separation policy. They blur the limits 
between the military and the civil, the inside and the outside, between past, present and future. They 
also readjust hierarchies and status between Israelis and Palestinians, as well as between Palestinians 
themselves. Chapter 3 deals with the juridical dimensions of the geography of occupation. Emilio 
Dabed shows that in the context of the absence of Palestinian territorial and political sovereignty, the 
drafting of the Palestinian constitution was strongly influenced by the asymmetrical power relations 
between the PA and Israel as well as between international actors and experts and the PA. Chapter 4 
concludes this part by providing a counter intuitive approach in which Ariel Handel deconstructs the 
narratives by which occupation is usually analyzed and criticized. He demonstrates how the built-in 
utilitarian biases of these languages actually create misunderstanding of the space Palestinians use and 
the specific relations and emotional links they develop towards it. 
Part II scrutinizes the economic and commercial exchanges between Israeli and Palestinian 
territories during the post-Second Intifada. Chapter 5 studies the crossings handling the formal transit 
of goods between the south of the West Bank and Israel (Garb); chapter 6 analyzes the smuggling 
from Israel to the West Bank (Natsheh and Parizot) and chapter 7 provides an analysis of the tunnel 
economy between the Gaza strip and Egypt (Pelham). The authors highlight the complex 
 
 
configurations of power emerging along Israeli-Palestinian “borders.” The new mechanisms of 
regulations and models of territoriality they highlight challenge the imaginary of the modern nation 
state. In order to better situate these forms of economic and territorial control in an historical 
perspective, chapter 8 analyzes the changes in Israeli economic policies towards the Palestinian 
Territories since 1967. Lev Grinberg shows how patterns of the military-economic domination regime 
were shaped by the interests, power relations and compromises between the military, the dominant 
economic groups and the ruling party. 
Part III decenters the gaze to the margins of Palestinian and Israeli society by considering how 
the separation has been experienced among different groups: the volunteers of a peripheral town in the 
Israeli police (chapter 9); Palestinians of Israel (chapter 10); and among Israeli and Palestinian 
LGBTQ activists (chapter 11). Israeli Palestinians cross the separation lines more than other Israeli 
Jewish citizens and more than Palestinians of the OPT, thus carving a specific place in both national 
arenas. Similarly, police volunteers, mizrahim (“oriental”) Israelis from a development town, play a 
special role in building the separation by reconstructing the stereotyped image of the Arab enemy, i.e., 
of the “terrorist.” Lastly, Israeli LGBTQ mobilizations show how sexual minorities and sexual 
identities are embedded in national considerations, and in “homonationalism.” In this context, 
Palestinian LGBTQ organizations (mostly formed by Palestinians from Israel or Jerusalem) have 
defended at the sexual rights and Palestinian political rights at the same time. Being part of the most 
influential Palestinian popular resistance movement they are drawing new political boundaries where 
marginal sexualities are no longer associated with political deviance. 
Part IV continues this reflection on the experiences and effects of crossings taking place 
within specific political actions: the travels of organized tours of French pro-Palestinian and pro-
Israeli activists (Hecker); the clandestine crossings of Anarchists against the Wall within Palestinians 
enclaves; and those of Palestinian suicide bombers (Nashif).18 While these crossings and actions are 
radically different from one another, they all contribute, in their ways and at their different scales, to 
adjust and construct the boundaries of the Israeli-Palestinian spaces. These practices do not really 
                                               
18 Called “martyrdom operations” by the actors. 
 
 
challenge the separation regime and are rather shaped by the very frames imposed by Israel. Yet, they 
do contribute to the definition and the reproduction of these groups’ collective identities. 
 
The Politics of Research 
Like political and media discourses, researchers’ narratives are also significant for the parties in 
conflict. In this highly polarized verbal minefield, researchers have to be cautious and show greater 
courage than in other research fields. The role of research is not to produce arguments backing one 
party or both, but to create explanatory models capable of making sense of the reality of a conflict that 
has changed greatly over the last 20 years. But it is not an easy task as both the definition the research 
objects and scientific collaborations developed in this context have political dimensions. 
Working on the interaction and interconnectedness between Israeli-Palestinian spaces 
necessarily highlights the current obstacles to the creation of a viable Palestinian State in the near 
future. It also means questioning the current representations/definition of a State of Israel. Deprived of 
borders with Palestinians, Israel cannot be conceived as a democracy just like other democracies and 
neither as a state whose majority is Jewish. Though, it breaks away from the political horizon defined 
by the Oslo process. We are conscious that this scientific position clearly comes into conflict with 
national perceptions that have been forged and perpetuated by ideologies and collective imaginings, 
but we need to analyze the social, political and territorial reality prevailing today on the ground. As 
researchers, our perspective is not of course to take a stand in the discussion about one or two states—
this is clearly for the Palestinians and the Israelis to decide—but rather to consider the concrete impact 
of the redeployments of the occupation over the last 20 years on such political projects 
Working on this conflict also raises issues of scientific partnership. Our work has been 
undertaken within the framework of two research programs “Appraising the Israeli Palestinian 
Conflict through Cross Border Mobility” and “Mobility and Borders in the Israeli Palestinian Spaces.” 
Initially conceived by Cédric Parizot as an extension of his research in the mid-1990s on mobility in 
the south of the Israeli-Palestinian spaces (West Bank, Israel, Gaza), these projects where coordinated 
jointly with Stéphanie Latte Abdallah between 2007 and 2011. They brought together French, 
Palestinian, Swiss, Italian, and Israeli researchers working on both sides of the Israeli and Palestinian 
 
 
divide, or between the two, in the interspace. We stress the fact that we are talking about researchers 
working on both sides and not about researchers coming from the two sides. Our aim was not to bring 
Israelis into discussion with Palestinians but rather to acquire the means for a better understanding of 
the mechanisms of the Israeli occupation since the Oslo Accords. 
Each researcher took part in the program individually. We decided to avoid any institutional 
cooperation with Israeli or Palestinian universities or research centers. This was firstly to avoid any 
political obstacles or orientations that our scientific approach might have aroused; secondly, because 
we refuse any attempt to promote dialogue or the normalization of relations between Israelis and 
Palestinians which cannot be among the objectives of a scientific program. In institutional terms, the 
projects were financed out of European funds, as part of the Ramses² European Excellence Network, 
and French funds. They benefited from the partnership of French laboratories18 and a Swiss research 
institute.19 
We should point out that despite our very clear position on institutional scientific cooperation, 
it remains very difficult to work in this interspace due to scientific compartmentalization, political 
obstacles, and the unequal capacity of mobility of the project members. 
Firstly, the strict compartmentalization of French research into Palestinian studies and Israeli 
studies contributes to these difficulties. On the one hand, French students and researchers work on one 
side or the other and are only rarely in the same institutions. On the other, the historical processes in 
which Israelis and Palestinians have been involved have created different research agendas within 
each society. This trend has been accentuated because academics have approached their histories as 
exceptional trajectories, inviting few comparisons with other contexts (Tamari 1997, p. 20). Moreover, 
                                               
18 Institute for Research and Studies of the Arab and Muslim Worlds (Institut de Recherches sur les Mondes arabes et 
musulman—IREMAM), Institute for Mediterranean European and Comparative Studies (l’Institut d’Etudes 
Méditerranéennes Européennes et Comparatives—IDEMEC), Mediterranean Institute for Humanities (Maison 
Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l’Homme) in Aix-en-Provence (USR 3125), French Research Centre, Jerusalem (Centre de 
Recherche Français à Jérusalem—CRFJ), and the French Institute for International Research (Institut Français de Recherches 
Internationales—IFRI). 
19 Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales et du 
Développement—IHEID) in Geneva. 
 
 
the rapid deterioration of the situation after the signing of the Oslo Accords first legitimized separate 
scientific approaches before placing additional political and material obstacles to dialogue between 
researchers and institutions working on Israel or Palestine. We are not denying the autonomy of the 
two research fields, but simply stressing the need to leave room for an approach to the interspace, the 
only one that is capable of making sense of the redeployments of the occupation since the Oslo 
Accords. 
These political obstacles are all the more sensitive in a context of the radicalization of 
positions since the Second Intifada and the ongoing violence that has marked the post Intifada period. 
We are referring here to the summer 2006 Israel–Lebanon war and the military offensives in Gaza 
(summer 2006, December to January 2008–2009,  November 2012 and July to August 2014) which, 
with their declared dissuasive aim, involved the use of ever greater violence. The continuation of the 
occupation and these particularly destructive Israeli military offensives have reinforced not only in 
Palestine but elsewhere, the efforts to boycott Israeli institutions: the BDS (boycotts, divestment, and 
sanctions) movement has gradually mobilized groups and activists all over the world. 
On the Israeli side, the situation has hardened considerably and many within the Israeli 
population now reject the idea of a new withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. As for those who 
criticize the occupation and the military operations, they have often prompted virulent reactions that 
have made activists groups who reject the national consensus forged from 2000 onward more and 
more marginalized (Marteu 2009a). Furthermore, a certain number of Israeli academics have faced 
considerable hostility and been subjected to pressure from within their institutions and some have even 
left the country. 
Finally local and foreign researchers on the ground have encountered obstacles to their 
movements. Apart from the deterioration of the conflict and tensions between the two parties, 
restrictions on movement and security measures have naturally affected research in the field. While it 
is difficult, indeed dangerous, for Israeli researchers to carry out research on the Palestinian side, it is 
virtually impossible for Palestinian researchers from the Occupied Territories, unless they are natives 
of Jerusalem. Our team was also unable to carry out research in the Gaza Strip because of the blockade 
and ban on entry that the Israeli authorities impose on Israelis, West Bank Palestinians and foreigners, 
 
 
the only exceptions being Nicolas Pelham. Thanks to his press card, he could enter the Strip and 
conduct a fine analysis of the Gaza Tunnels. 
Confronted with the complex reality of the occupation each observer has to take responsibility 
for his or her own position. Depending on our contacts, our political environment and our scientific 
career, we can experience considerable political, personal or material difficulties in undertaking this 
type of fieldwork investigation. Incidentally, we could have laid more emphasis on these problems and 
thought jointly about our biographies, mobility, approaches and scientific tools that they have led us to 
adopt. 
To the difficult nature of the research practices in this context we must add the equally 
complex question of the concepts and terms used by the different contributors. Defining and 
harmonizing the concepts used is a challenge the authors of any collective work have to deal with. In 
this case the problem is heightened. More than elsewhere, people and groups in the Israeli-Palestinian 
territories are identified by the words they use. The extreme polarization and the tidal wave of political 
and media arguments that this conflict has prompted identify them immediately, sometimes even in 
spite of their authors. It is now clear that moving from one space to another or taking up a position in 
the interspace makes it particularly difficult to choose the words and concepts needed to describe a 
reality scientifically without immediately being classified as a stranger or an enemy. 
We agreed on the more frequent use of the term “Wall” in preference to “Barrier.” This choice 
was clearly not neutral as the term “Wall” evokes more clearly the massive, violent nature of what is 
being built and its territorial impact (confiscation, expulsion, and annexation of Palestinian lands) as 
well as the project of separation and its multiple demographic and symbolic dimensions. The terms 
“Barrier” or “Fence,” on the other hand, seemed to us euphemisms for the structure. Despite certain 
editorial choices, we have to accept that the use of certain sometimes problematic terms has not been 
harmonized. In the last analysis each author is free and responsible for his or her text and the words 
and concepts used therein. The different terminologies relate to distinct frames of reference and 
existing areas of discussion, and sometimes to very different personal and political stances. 
Lastly, we should stress that the terms may vary, not always because of a consciously adopted 
stance or policy, but most often according to what the terms signify for the different actors: this is the 
 
 
case, for example, with the terms “occupied territories” or “Palestinian territories” and that of 
“Palestinian enclaves.” If one is referring to the shape of these territories the term “enclaves” appears 
more appropriate but when one is describing the perception of a political and symbolic experience or 
the internationally recognized legal reality, the term “occupied Palestinian territories” is more relevant. 
While the absence of terminological uniformity may disturb, it is inherent to the very subject and 
approach of this book which tackles the Israeli–Palestinian conflict concretely from the points of view 
of its many actors and the representations of the conflict they communicate. 
 
